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The Responsibility to Protect (R2P):  
A way forward - or rather part of the problem? 
 
 
 
To the surprise of many observers, the principle of the “responsibility to protect” (R2P) 
was enshrined in the Outcome Document adopted by the heads of state and govern-
ment at the United Nations Millennium +5 Summit in September 2005. The concept 
was initially developed in 2001 in the Report of the International Commission on Inter-
vention and State Sovereignty (ICISS). In their report, the members of the Commission 
argued that when a state is unwilling or unable to protect its citizens from massive 
human rights violations such as genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, 
the principle of non-intervention yields to the international responsibility to protect. 
This embraces three specific responsibilities: the responsibility to prevent, the 
responsibility to react, and the responsibility to rebuild. 
In this issue of Foreign Voices, Thelma Ekiyor from the West Africa Civil Society Insti-
tute and Professor Mary Ellen O’Connell from the University of Notre Dame, Indiana, 
discuss whether this new concept means a way forward in dealing with atrocity crimes 
or whether it rather causes new problems. Both authors were speakers at the Interna-
tional SEF Symposium 2007 on “The Responsibility to Protect – Progress, Empty Pro-
mise or a Licence for ‘Humanitarian’ Intervention” that took place on 29-30 November 
2007 in Bonn. 
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”Enhancing regional structures will be essential”  
The debate on the Responsibility to Protect doctrine has gained momentum across the 
world. While there is consensus that a collective international response is needed to 
prevent atrocities like Kosovo and Rwanda from recurring, avoid the intervention 
mishap of Somalia in 1993 or the weakness of the UN’s intervention in Srebrenica in 
Bosnia in 1995, there is little agreement that R2P is the answer. Since the doctrine was 
adopted at the United Nations World Summit in 2005, debates in different parts of the 
world have centred on the problematic reality of its implementation. Nowhere more so 
than in Africa, where many argue is the testing ground for R2P. 
A definition that needs clarity 
The literature on R2P as conceived by the International Commission on Intervention 
and State Sovereignty (ICISS) report makes it clear that the protection umbrella is 
biased towards the responsibility to prevent. However, where all preventive measures 
fail, then the responsibility to react can be activated after it has met a high threshold. 
This responsibility must be accompanied by the responsibility to rebuild. However, in 
discussions on R2P, this bias for prevention is often not highlighted. The focus seems to 
be more on the second pillar of reaction. A number of reasons have been given for this 
misinterpretation of the doctrine. Many commentators in the global south and particu-
larly in Africa believe that the entire doctrine aims to serve as a camouflage for the real 
interventionist intentions of powerful states. In the climate of the “war on terrorism” 
and the general mistrust that accompanied the United States of America’s disregard for 
the United Nations in its invasion of Iraq, this view has gained popularity, putting 
proponents of R2P on the defensive.  
Clarifying the meaning and intention of the doctrine will not be an easy task. Memories 
of colonialism and apartheid are fresh in many parts of the world, like Africa, where 
R2P will be implemented, and the doctrine will be viewed through these old blurred 
lenses. Additionally, most governments and people in the global south want their voi-
ces to be heard not as peripheral interjections, but as central players in geopolitics. 
Thus, the conversation on R2P two years after the World Summit needs to involve buil-
ding trust among various actors and including diverse viewpoints on the meaning of 
concepts like “responsibility” and “protection” in different contexts.  
One responsibility, different interpretations 
Africa has witnessed some of the world’s worst violent civil wars and atrocities.  
Though there has been a marked decrease in the number of outbreaks of wars on the 
continent, there still persist intense situations that call for urgent intervention, such as 
Sudan, Somalia and now surprisingly Kenya. Memories of the wars in Liberia, Sierra 
Leone, Burundi and the Democratic Republic of Congo have led African leaders 
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through the African Union to commit to the “right to intervene” in a Member State 
pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely war 
crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity. Thus, though many critics of the R2P 
doctrine in Africa denounce it as a tool to promote parochial goals, African govern-
ments seem to concur with the principle that protecting civilians from mass atrocities is 
an overriding responsibility. However, interpretation of that responsibility has taken 
different forms.  
While there is acceptance that the responsibility for safeguarding international peace 
and security lies with the UN Security Council, limited political will in the Security 
Council to readily intervene in past African crises have generated support for “African 
solutions to African problems”. The AU and Regional Economic Communities (RECs) 
have taken the challenge of intervening in situations on the continent and the outcomes 
have had mixed results. For example, the African Union Mission in Burundi (AMIB) 
was the first AU mission conceptualized and executed by member states. Regarded as 
a success, the AU managed a situation that could have led the country into chaos and 
destruction similar to Rwanda. The AU’s ability and willingness to intervene in a 
situation where the government of Burundi was unable to protect its citizens, is an 
example of a regional body practically implementing one of the pillars of R2P.   
Other examples of interventions by regional organisations across the continent have 
been cited as possible R2P cases, e.g. the controversial interventions of the Economic 
Community of West African States’ (ECOWAS) Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) led by 
Nigeria in Liberia and Sierra Leone in the 90s were a case of a regional powerhouse 
and a regional organisation taking the responsibility to intervene in neighboring states. 
Though critics have cited Nigeria’s hegemonic claims as the reasons for these interven-
tions, the positive outcome was that they defused the situation and paved the way for 
stronger, well organized peacekeeping missions. Furthermore, the interventions were 
the catalyst for strengthening ECOWAS to serve as a regional peace and security insti-
tution able to intervene in subsequent conflicts in Guinea-Bissau.  
Strengthening the responsibility to prevent 
A critical point of impasse in the conversation on the interpretation of R2P is the 
decision on which situations meet the threshold for R2P. The prominent opposing 
views on this are that the norm is ambiguous on when intervention can be used; and 
conversely, that the norm is too narrow in its application stating that in places like 
Africa a broader framework that incorporates human security issues is needed, and 
that the international campaign for R2P is eclipsing the discourse on human security. 
Though pioneers of R2P posit that bringing in human security issues will dilute the 
focus of R2P, it might be necessary to find areas of complementarity between both 
concepts.  
A main source of confusion on which cases qualify as R2P situations is the tendency to 
focus on the reaction pillar, and in particular military intervention. The threshold for 
military intervention is very high and includes war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes 
against humanity. However, more awareness should be raised on the availability of 
other measures under the reaction umbrella such as economic sanctions, diplomatic 
isolation, and prosecution.  
Emphasis should also be placed on strengthening and promoting the prevention ambit 
which includes a commitment to promoting good governance, democratization, ap-
propriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means. This pillar of R2P in practice is 
often unheralded as it usually requires efforts that do not gain the attention of the 
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international media, such as the mediation role played by the ECOWAS in mitigating 
the tensions in Togo and Guinea in 2004 and 2007 respectively.  
Sudan has been highlighted as a clear case of R2P in Africa. The argument states that 
the gravity of the situation in the country – genocide or otherwise (depending on who 
you ask) – meets the requirement of preventing crimes against humanity outlined in 
the World Summit outcome document. However, Sudan is proving to be a highly divi-
sive and problematic case for R2P. On one hand, international accord exists that the in-
human victimization, rape and killings of the Darfurians in Sudan is abominable, and 
that the Khartoum government’s unwillingness and increasing inability to protect 
civilians is a clear case for reaction by the international community. On the other hand, 
galvanizing decisive support for that reaction has been slow. The old problem of 
power struggles and competing agendas in the Security Council has hindered action; 
Russia and China with economic ties with Sudan are not in favour of a robust inter-
vention, while the United States though speaking forcefully against the Khartoum 
government, is weakened by the Iraq experience and is hesitant to intervene in another 
Islamic State.  
The responsibility to intervene fell to the AU.  Though the AU was very willing to 
intervene in Darfur, it was severely under-capacitated and under-resourced making 
the African Mission in Sudan (AMIS) force unable to protect victims of the crisis. The 
failure to provide AMIS with adequate resources and a clear and decisive mandate 
undermined the AU and as the situation worsens and becomes more politicized, it is 
apparent that R2P has not been operationalised in Sudan.   
The above examples illustrate that implementing R2P in Africa requires the active 
participation of regional organisations. Nevertheless, the continent’s regional peace-
keeping apparatus is struggling and in many cases still in the formative stages. There-
fore enhancing these structures will be essential to implementing R2P. In addition, 
preventive arrangements such as the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) and 
its regional branches, the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), the New Partner-
ship for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) and mediation structures like the Panel of 
Wise and the ECOWAS Council of Elders should be reinforced.  
These organisations by and large have credibility and acceptance on the ground. Their 
visible roles in implementing R2P will assist in allaying the fears of those who view 
R2P as a tool by old colonial powers to interfere in the affairs of sovereign states.  
The future of R2P 
Despite the ongoing debates over R2P, what is incontrovertible is that the norm is now 
a part of the international relations’ lexicon. The ICISS report and the subsequent 
World Summit outcome document provided a framework for the global community to 
act decisively to prevent systematic and deliberate human rights violations. However, 
ensuring that the norm guides policy making and practice on the ground will continue 
to be a challenge.  
The problems facing the implementation of the concept by the world body include the 
threat of fatigue among the electorate in Western countries with situations in places 
like Africa needing urgent interventions, States’ disregard for the norm and lack of 
political will, authorisation, and operational capacity. There is also the more practical 
challenge of broadly based understanding and acceptance of the norm.  
The task therefore for advocates of R2P is to repackage or demystify the norm to make 
it relevant to all sides. Regional organisations can also play critical roles in this process, 
by discussing the norm in the context of regional realities and challenges. Civil society 
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actors have begun the process.  A number of seminars organised by organisations in 
the global north and south have begun the process of raising awareness of the norm 
and promoting acceptance. These seminars have also provided a platform for exchange 
between actors with different views and opinions of R2P. Such platforms are important 
as the eventual success of implementing R2P will depend to a large extent on its 
acceptance by state actors and governments, non-state actors, civil society and 
international organisations. A global collaboration by all of these actors at different 
levels will serve as a monitoring and accountability mechanism on the norm to ensure 
that the world will truly never again stand by and watch man-made atrocities occur. 
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”Opposing the new militarism”  
As individuals concerned with human rights contemplate how best to implement the 
concept of “responsibility to protect”, the time is right to advocate for an additional 
R2P concept: “responsibility to peace”.  If the point of R2P is the protection of people, 
of their fundamental human rights, there is almost no better way to accomplish such 
protection than through the promotion of peace: peace is the greatest human right. 
It is important to speak of peace and human rights now because, since the end of the 
Cold War, the legal and moral norm prohibiting the use of force has been eroding.  
These comments address this erosion, what has contributed to it, and why we should 
work to reverse it.  They could be entitled: opposing the new militarism. 
The Idea of Peace 
The eminent British historian Michael Howard reminds us in his long essay, The Inven-
tion of Peace (2000), that the norm of peace, which we enshrined in the United Nations 
Charter, is a relatively new one. In fact, it took the horrors of World War I and II to 
move the world to committing to the United Nations Charter with its substantive norm 
against war and its procedures for the preservation of peace.  Charter Article 2(4) is a 
general prohibition on the use of force.  The United Nations Security Council was de-
signed to enforce the prohibition.  The Charter contains only two exceptions to Article 
2(4): force in self-defense to an armed attack and force with Security Council authori-
zation.   
Since the Charter was drafted, numerous decisions of the International Court of Justice, 
resolutions of the UN Security Council, General Assembly and official government 
statements have also confirmed the binding nature of the Charter’s rules and their 
meaning.  Indeed, the international community has repeatedly affirmed its support for 
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the regime of peace and the prohibition on the use of force.  The most recent and signi-
ficant reaffirmation came with the overwhelming vote of confidence in the Charter 
during the September 2005 World Summit in New York. 
The New Militarism 
This reaffirmation of the Charter regime for peace became necessary despite the fact 
that following the Cold War, the world had new hope that the Charter would be 
followed more strictly.  In 1990-1991, the international community came together to 
liberate Kuwait from Iraq’s unlawful invasion.  That successful use of force, however, 
gave some the idea that is was time to use military force more, not less often.  This was 
the thinking behind NATO’s decision to bomb Serbia in March 1999 in reaction to 
human rights violations in Kosovo.  The bombing did not have Security Council 
authorization.  The Russians in particular had advocated against such a use of force 
arguing it would do more harm than good.  They made clear that they would not vote 
to authorize the bombing in the Security Council. 
The dispute over Security Council authorization of the Kosovo bombing campaign led 
to the United Kingdom indicating it was interested in aiding in the development of a 
doctrine of humanitarian intervention.  Soon after the Canadian government founded 
the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) to study 
the idea, and R2P was born.  For the most part the ICISS report reinforces existing in-
ternational law, especially human rights obligations of states.  It does, however, 
include a significant departure from the Charter in the following passage: 
E. If the Security Council rejects a proposal or fails to deal with it in a 
reasonable time, alternative options are: 
I. consideration of the matter by the General Assembly in Emergency 
Special Session under the “Uniting for Peace” procedure; and 
II. action within area of jurisdiction by regional or sub-regional organiza-
tions under Chapter VIII of the Charter, subject to their seeking subse-
quent authorization from the Security Council. 
Had this been the rule in place during Kosovo, it might have provided a legal basis for 
NATO’s use of force.  Given, however, that human rights monitors were mitigating 
violence against Kosovo Albanians, the situation may not have met the atrocity para-
meters of the ICISS report. 
A great deal of attention was devoted to the R2P concept following the ICISS report.  
The U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in March 2003 seemed to lead to a new, general anti-war 
sentiment throughout the world, however, and the interest in war for humanitarian 
purposes seemed to wane with the rising toll of deaths, injury and destruction.  The 
UN Secretary General’s High Level Panel on United Nations Reform, reporting in No-
vember 2004, and the Secretary General’s own report of September 2005, both refe-
renced R2P but reaffirmed the need for Security Council authorization.  And that is 
what the world confirmed at the Summit. Nevertheless, there remains a persistent 
view that the unauthorized use of force in pursuance of humanitarian goals is legiti-
mate. Indeed, a view has emerged that force for a variety of goals, despite the Charter 
prohibition, is now lawful. 
A false sense of security 
The people who drafted the UN Charter had much clearer understanding of the nature 
of war, however, what it can accomplish and what it cannot.  The Charter prohibition 
on humanitarian intervention is built on well-considered normative and pragmatic 
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underpinnings.  For that reason, it has withstood until now arguments in favor of such 
intervention.  The heart of the matter is that major military force is a poor tool for the 
sort of complex social problems present in humanitarian crises.  The military 
consistently advise political leaders that using force to protect human rights is extreme-
ly difficult.  The results in Kosovo bear out that advice, as do many other examples.   
The cases show that military intervention for humanitarian purposes, on balance, has 
accomplished more harm than good.  This fact rarely comes up when intervention is 
demanded. Rather, proponents continue to cite the Srebrenica and Rwanda tragedies.  
The argument is that if Western countries had used military force while the killing in 
those places was in progress, it could have been stopped.  This argument fails to 
acknowledge that the presence of inadequate Western military forces helped set the 
conditions for the tragedies in the first place.  In both Bosnia and Rwanda, lightly-
armed UN peacekeepers were present.  They had mandates to do more than they 
could.  Their presence gave people a false sense of security.  If the peacekeepers had 
not been there, people may well have done more to protect themselves.  In Srebrenica, 
Bosnians would not have remained in the vicinity of Serb militias if the UN had not 
promised to protect them.  In Rwanda, Tutsis may not have trusted their Hutu neigh-
bors while Tutsi rebels were advancing on the country.  The presence of UN troops in 
these situations, situations that lacked the conditions for classical peacekeeping, seems 
to have been a factor in the tragedies.  Why should we expect that sending inadequate 
forces in the wrong conditions into future humanitarian crises will have better out-
comes? 
When the poor record of military force to protect human rights is reviewed, some try to 
counter it by arguing that states have simply failed to commit the requisite resources.  
Committing resources is surely part of the problem.  Since states are unlikely, however, 
ever to commit the massive resources that may be necessary for successful humanita-
rian intervention, in complex multi-faction conflicts over major land-masses, this factor 
weighs against changing the law in favor of intervention.  And even if massive resour-
ces are committed, resources alone cannot overcome the need for communities to de-
velop their own leadership—leaders who are identified with the community they will 
lead and not with a foreign power.  The United States has committed billions of dollars 
and massive numbers of troops in Iraq and yet violence, chaos, and ethnic cleansing 
continue at time of writing as insurgents fight the foreign invader.  International law 
recognizes the human right of self-determination and that right is violated when out-
side powers determine a community’s leadership. 
Corrosive impact on human rights law 
Inherent in the idea of humanitarian intervention is the contradiction that it is accep-
table to kill and injure some, even wholly innocent people, to preserve human rights of 
others.  In addition, the advocacy for intervening in disregard of the law is also contra-
dictory in that international law—the treaties, customary international law rules, and 
general principles that establish human rights—forms the basis of the claim that it is 
legitimate to intervene.  Advocates of humanitarian intervention fail to take into ac-
count the corrosive impact on the law of human rights when they champion the use of 
force in violation of the law.  The arguments for ignoring the Charter in the Kosovo 
Crisis clearly undermined respect for the Charter on the eve of the U.S.-led invasion of 
Iraq.  U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell said on 20 October 2002, that the United 
States had the same authority to use force in Iraq that it had in Kosovo.   
Force is being used today to change governments, to stop weapons development, to 
deal with secessionist movements, to promote religion, democracy and more—all in-
Foreign Voices 1/2008 - 8 -
dications are that we are facing a new militarism, a new acceptance of the use of force 
and rejection of the norm of peace.  Unfortunately, R2P may have added to the new 
acceptability of war.  
Responsibility to peace 
If R2P has contributed to the new militarism, it is a tragic irony, as the authors of R2P 
plainly intended only to promote human rights protection.  We have seen demonstra-
ted again and again since 1991, however, that armed conflict is connected with the 
gravest human rights abuse.  Peace is the condition necessary to the flourishing of 
other rights.  If proponents of R2P begin to associate it with the additional R2P, respon-
sibility to peace, the original concept will have a better chance of succeeding in the 
protection of human rights.  The world needs to turn back to building the norm of 
peace, toward creating a general norm of nonviolence.  This can be achieved by advo-
cating that the responsibility to protect human rights includes the protection of the 
human right to peace, especially by advocating strict compliance with the UN Char-
ter’s prohibition on war. 
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